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Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds ? 
 
Joëlle Proust 




Attributing mental concepts to non-linguistic animals poses well-known 
problems to ethologists and philosophers. It is all too easy to interpret a piece 
of animal social behavior (i.e. a behavior performed inside a group on the basis 
of information being displayed by behaviors from other members of the 
group) as involving representations of other individual's beliefs and 
motivational states as mental states. For this "intentional stance"1  is indeed the 
most natural way for humans to explain and predict each other's behavior. 
Attributing mental states is a fast, easy and convenient way to predict behavior, 
even when it is known that the system under study  cannot be granted 
intentionality - convenient in so far as it may allow instrumentally correct 
predictions, that sometimes  are also strictly speaking false. 
Intentionality refers to the property of some states (brain states, artefacts, or 
other material structures) to be about something else (like some repeatable 
event or property in the external world).  The mental states that are typically 
intentional states are beliefs (that such and such is the case) and desires (that 
such and such should  be the case). Now the capacity of forming beliefs and 
desires has to be distinguished from the ability to read mental states as such, i.e. 
to attribute mental contents to oneself or to other individuals. Having an 
intentional capacity does not any more secure a mindreading ability,  than 
exerting a physical force provides the agent with a concept of cause. As one can 
exploit (extract and use) causal information without having the concept of 
cause, one can also exploit "mental" information without having the concept of 
mind nor of any  mental state.  
Ethologists and philosophers tend now to acknowledge that most animals are 
able to form representations, and to use them in controlling  their own 
behaviors. Animals extract and store information, and retrieve it when 
necessary : although they are not endowed with an external language, their 
neural dynamics are partly dedicated to representing correlations in their 
environment. A more refined way of forming representations allows the 
animals to represent features in the external world that are observer-
independent. This capacity to extract "distal information" is, according to some 
philosophers, distinctive of the disposition to form, and use, mental 
representations2. 
Granted  that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have 
(epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable 
contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation 
is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only 
perceptual or physical, but mental as well, and use the latter to guide their 
actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues; 
this assumption amounts to proposing that the animal indeed  possesses some 
kind of a theory of mind. Since early work by Premack & Woodruff3, a theory 
of mind refers to the kind of knowledge that an organism has when it uses 
mental concepts such as those of belief and desire, and relies on the regularities 
that hold between those kinds of internal states, in order to understand and 
predict behaviour of conspecifics.  
As David Premack notes4, there are two ways of understanding a piece of   
social behavior in non-linguistic animals, i.e. two types of reasons that can cause 
the actions performed by an individual in a social context. In one case, the 
animal can "act so as to affect what the other individual does ; in the other case, 
so as to affect what the other individual believes".  In the second case only is it 
legitimate to take the relevant behavior as evidence for the animal having a 
"theory of mind".  
Establishing this contrast may indeed prove difficult. For in the first case 
(aiming at affecting what the other individual does), often the only effective 
strategies - learned through their consequences or selected for through 
evolution - will be what is in fact deception or mimicry, concepts that may be 
well beyond the agent's conceptual repertoire. And in the second case (aiming 
at affecting what the other individual believes), the animal also aims at affecting 
ultimately what the other individual does.  The difference between the two 
cases is not in their respective final goals, but only in the means used to achieve 
them. If a male chimpanzee is indeed able to refrain from vocalizing while 
copulating with a female when male conspecifics are in the vicinity, it may be 
because he believes that other males would learn about the presence of a 
receptive female if he produced his sexual cry, and would therefore want to 
approach her in turn. As he wants to keep her for himself, he thus prefers to 
refrain from vocalizing at the cost of reducing his present pleasure. But the 
same behavior could also happen simply because the copulating male knows 
from previous experience that suppressing his cry  will have the favorable 
effect of his having exclusive access to the receptive female. No use of belief-
desire attribution  in this "kill-joy" story5.  Again,  there is no difference in the 
two types of behaviors as to their purposes.  In all behaviors displaying social 
cognition, whether achieved by perceptual learning or by using a theory of 
mind, the purpose is fundamentally the same : manipulating others, or 
extracting information from the others' behaviors, in order to promote the 
capacities of the individual organism to fulfill his own basic needs. In social 
animals, one has to learn to manipulate others into acting according to one's 
own interest (safety, food sharing, mating, etc.);   these actions may  well be 
executed without being rationalized by "mental concepts" (to be analysed in a  a 
moment).6 
There is a second source of indeterminacy. A "mentalizing" animal may well use 
mental concepts in an entirely non-reflexive way, that is, use his theory of mind 
in a tacit manner. Having a theory of mind no more requires knowing that one 
does, than competence in language production requires knowing which rules 
one follows, neither, indeed, knowing at all that one follows rules. One 
therefore cannot expect that an animal having a theory of mind in the sense 
that it uses some mental rules to infer what other individuals will do next, 
should also be able to categorize mental attitudes in himself in any principled 
way, or recognize that another individual is doing just what himself does, i.e. 
attribute mental states.If one rejects an anthropocentric definition of mental 
attribution, the question of the kind of condition that is necessary and sufficient 
for  attributing mental concepts to an animal becomes prominent. The criterion 
should not involve too much (reflexivity), while still including enough of the 
features that are linked to conceptual ability. 
Finally, still a third problem emerges when one discusses non linguistic animal 
mentalization : not only should we distinguish levels or orders of  theory of 
mind application ; we should also carefully establish which kind of theory of 
mind it is correct and adequate to attribute to an individual of a given age with 
a given background in a given species. Human developmental psychology 
suggests that, while infants may initially only understand the contrast between 
physical objects and self-propelled, goal-directed entities,  children first acquire 
a primitive theory including only elementary epistemic and motivational states, 
like seeing, expecting and desiring, with no sense of the possibility of false 
belief ; the full complex of belief-desire folk psychology appears only later , and 
with it the idea that another may have a set of beliefs that is different from 
one's own on the same object7. It is then perfectly clear that human toddlers 
will not display the same mental capacities as older children and adults. Great 
apes could also have varying access to social and mental cognition according to 
their age and past experience. Another related problem has to do with the 
differences introduced by early exposure to human ways and in particular, to 
experimental training.  It is assumed by many researchers that specific 
conditions -- such as a high level of early social interaction, and some kind of 
reinforcement of the intentional stance -- might constrain theory of mind 
acquisition, and that animals either too young, or raised in the wild, or isolated 
from their group,  will fail to display mindreading abilities while older apes, 
hand-reared or laboratory animals might more often present this set of 
capacities.8 
 
Given that  mental attribution is an intricate kind of competence, with a range 
and a degree of complexity that are a priori indeterminate, one thing is clear : 
anecdotes are an inadequate way of establishing mental concepts use in non-
linguistic animals. The proneness of humans to make sense in the richest 
mentalistic terms of just any kind of goal-directed behavior introduces  a 
serious methodological flaw in efforts to capture the meaning of an animal's 
behavior  by describing   field observations -however carefully collected- in 
intuitive terms. This problem has been recognized and widely discussed by 
ethologists, experimental psychologists and philosophers.9 "No single 
anecdote, Heyes writes, could provide convincing evidence that an animal's 
behaviour was influenced, not by a social interactant's appearance or 
behaviour, but by a mental state attribution based on those stimuli"10. 
Experimental research, although able to offer tighter control for antecedent 
learning, still often fails to eliminate the possibility that an animal performs 
behavioural prediction on the basis of observational cues or learned sequences 
rather than on the basis of mental attribution. In her influential paper,  Heyes 
exposes the comparative merits of three different types of experimental 
paradigms testing theory of mind capacities.  
The discrimination training method, used by Premack & Woodruff,  aims at 
testing the mental capacities of chimpanzees in situations that seem to require 
recognition of mental properties. But these problems, immediately represented 
by mental concepts in humans (e.g., "he believes what I tell him; I will let him 
believe something wrong") can also  receive solutions exploiting exclusively  
contingencies between behaviours and outcomes. If the animal is able to show 
the wrong, non baited,  container to the competitive trainer in order to deny 
him access to food, it may be because the animal extracted a regularity roughly 
like : "show the baited container only to cooperative trainer". According to 
Heyes, this type of experimental design is not adapted to testing mentalizing 
capacities  in non-linguistic animals. It does not fare better than anecdotes that 
admit a mental interpretation (a female baboon  grooms a male who has 
caught an antelope until he lolls back away from his food because she wants to 
distract him11), as well as a cue-learning one (the female steals the food at the 
first opportunity).  
Another method discussed by Heyes is the "trapping" method  12,  i.e. an 
experimental test that does not require any previous training. This is 
exemplified by Cheney & Seyfarth's work on Japanese Macaques13, in which 
females were tested for the relative frequency of their food or predator calls 
when they could see, either in presence of their offspring or in their absence, 
that food or predator were hidden in an outdoor arena where the offspring 
(but not his mother) was subsequently allowed to enter. Although the 
frequency of calls was unchanged in the opposite conditions, Heyes shows that 
this negative result does not support any particular conclusion, given that a 
positive result could have been interpreted in terms of associative learning  and 
not in terms of mental state attribution (the paradigm confounds thus between 
recent presence and knowledge attribution, and recent absence and ignorance 
attribution). 
Now a third method, called "triangulation", consists in two phases : 
discrimination training is first developed, then transfer is tested on new items. 
Although this method can be misapplied in various, subtle ways, Heyes 
recognizes  the ability of triangulation to distinguish observable cues from 
mental cues : the trainers that  respectively know or guess where the food is 
located cannot, at least prima facie,  be identified by the animals on the basis of 
observation ; individual trainers change roles (knower, guesser) -- none of 
them having done the baiting -- and also do not have the same spatial 
characteristics (presence or absence from scene) across trials. Since the animals 
are able, from one situation to the next, to transfer the discrimination between 
the trainer who can reliably indicate food and the one who cannot, it seems 
justified to conclude, with Povinelli et al., that chimpanzees can "model the 
visual perspectives of others"14.  
Unfortunately, later work by Povinelli and his colleagues on knowledge about 
seeing in chimpanzees led to a different conclusion. They show that young 
chimpanzees do not perform above chance in discriminating two trainers, one 
able to see them, the other with his sight obstructed, in unfamiliar (not 
previously learned) situations (for example, one trainer had a bucket on his 
head, the other over his shoulder, or both trainers facing away from the 
animal, only one of them looking over his shoulder). Their experimental 
findings indicate that learning theory explains why chimpanzees have a 
preference for certain attitudes in communication, but it does not confirm that 
there is an intermediate variable that could play a role in their performance, 
having to do with the knowledge of what seeing entails. The authors establish 
that the stimulus that is actually used by the animals is the face, and not the 
eyes, although the chimpanzees  are also independently able to use the gaze 
direction of other individuals to extract the same visual information as the 
observed animal. In other words, chimpanzees understand seeing-as-attention, 
which involves only a motor routine (turning one's own attention to wherever 
the other looks at), and not "seeing as a knowledge acquisition device", which 
involves a primitive theory of mind15. 
 
This particular example of a remarkable set of experiments shows clearly that 
the first kind of indeterminacy (does the animal use observational cues or 
mental concepts ?) is not the only difficulty that besets progress in theory of 
mind research. A pervasive difficulty in cognitive ethology  is also that there is 
not any clear, well-developed conceptual framework for mental theorizing, 
universally accepted and well documented, that primatologists can use. Indeed 
Povinelli, Whiten, as well as other researchers in the field are confronted with 
general issues such as the modular or holistic character of mental concepts 
acquisition, or the role of metarepresentation in theory of mind competence, all 
questions that remain to be settled in developmental psychology; progress in 
primatology will follow from progress in child studies and in understanding 
human disorders of mentalization such as  autism. Thus even though the 
selection of adequate tests for the existence of  representations of mental states 
in non-linguistic animals is obviously an important condition for making 
progress, the main difficulty has not been solved : what exactly are the 
conditions in which one might say that an animal is able to read minds ? What  
are the kinds of competence involved in applying a theory of mind  ?  
Our strategy will be to first characterize abstractly mental concepts use, then to 
consider several types of competence present in nonhuman primates that 
might seem to qualify as mental-concept-using. Our aim in discussing potential 
mentalizing competence in the great apes will be to determine whether these 
animals exploit a particular  kind of  theory of mind, however minimal, in their 
interactions with conspecifics, and if it is the case, to find out which it is. 
 
 
Mental concepts use 
 
Before going any further, we need to have some notion of what a mental 
concept is, in terms general enough to apply to animals that do not have any 
words to shape, still less to express their mental attributions. Some 
philosophers, among whom Donald Davidson16, have contended that non-
linguistic animals simply lack the ability to apply concepts.  I will not, in the 
present paper, try to substantiate why I take the question of concept 
application in animals to be not only meaningful, but also manageable17.  It is  
safe to assume, given what we presently know on animal minds, that many 
animals  categorize objects or events on the basis of  non-purely perceptual 
features, for example in virtue of functional regularities. This helps the animal 
to memorize past experiences and make his action more flexible  in novel 
contexts. Having a concept of X presupposes that the following conditions are 
fulfilled.  
a) When an organism possesses concept X,  it is disposed to decide, in most 
cases, whether something is or is not an X and act accordingly (this is close to 
what is called, in classical philosophy, the "principle of complete determination"; 
it may fail to apply in certain cases, notably when concepts are "vague").  
b) Having a concept (on the basis of various past experiences or due to some 
innate disposition) allows the organism to apply it in the same way to new 
cases, - what is called "generalizing".  
Conditions a and b lead to the idea that conceptual thought is structured by 
what Gareth Evans called the "Generality Constraint".18 In other words, a 
concept may always  be used non-locally, i.e. systematically and in conjunction 
with all the other available concepts. 
c) Being part of an inferential structure, concepts tend to cluster in theories and 
become sensitive to counterevidence; they may be modified by learning, in 
particular when a theory replaces another theory, i.e. when a more adequate 
inferential structure overcomes a less adequate one.The fact that concepts have 
to be organized in theories is just a consequence of their inferential character. 
The types of theories that encompass concepts can be quite simple, like the 
theories that young human children entertain about living versus dead or 
inanimate entities19 . When one thinks about the kinds of theories that 
nonhuman social animals may have about social life, they include probably 
concepts of dominants, subordinated, children, adults, foes and allies, with all 
the associative and inferential links between these categories in terms of what 
kind of thing normally occurs when two individuals are in a certain situation 
(food sharing, presence of predator, mating, needing help etc.).  
 
If this characterization of concept use is correct, mental concept use in a 
nonhuman animal will be distinguished by the fact that characterization of 
social events and objects, and the selection of adequate courses of action  will be 
made on the basis of some mental inferential principles rather than on the basis 
of perceptual cues alone, or in virtue of other types of concepts -- for example 
non-mental social concepts -- that could apply to the same facts. In other words, 
inference rules will apply theory-laden mental regularities instead of associating 
perceptual, spatial, or other kinds of non-mental features. By a mental 
regularity, is understood some rationalizing connection between the mental 
contents of motivational and/or epistemic states.  
Still there are many different ways of rationalizing others' behaviours. Let us 
suggest some of the basic competences that could qualify as "mental" : 
  
1- Ability to recognize emotions in conspecifics and to respond adequately to 
them. 
2 - Ability to understand motivational states and the  objects that tend to cause 
them, and use these relations to predict behaviours. 
3 - Ability to understand perception as a source of knowledge in attributing 
epistemic states to others. 
4 - Ability to understand  means-end structure in others' behaviours: 
recognizing that others have specific intentions that explain their current 
sequence of action.  
5 - Ability to pretend that reality is different from what it is, and to understand 
perception of others from others' points of view. 
6 - Ability to recognize genuine intentional actions of others from accidental 
doings. 
7- Ability to attribute to others beliefs that are shared by self. 
8- Ability to attribute to others beliefs that are not shared by self. 
 
Many  researchers consider that the capacity quoted last on the list is 
constitutive for having a theory of mind. Evidence collected so far seems to 
indicate that no non-linguistic animal, and  no human child less than 3-and-a-
half  year old, are able to pass successfully the false belief task20. One of the 
reasons advanced is that only at the age of 3-and-a-half, is the full-fledged 
metarepresentational capacity   put to work in the child's mind (although it 
may start developing earlier in capacities  5, 6 and 7). This emphasis on 
metarepresentational capacity is linked to the view that  mindreading is the 
output of a specialized module having to do with higher forms of social 
cognition21. Other workers in the field try to make plausible the view that 
mindreading appears much earlier22.   
 
Now that we have some explicit definition for mental concepts, we face the 
following problem : what kind of theory about internal states will count as 
mental ? Assuming that great apes, for example, are indeed able to store 
regularities and make inferences on the basis of prior learning, what kind of 
difference can help us establish that a prediction about behavior is done on the 
basis of a mental theory, and not on the basis of some other kind of theory ?  
  
 
Joint attention and the idea of a precursor of the theory of mind. 
 
Researchers in the theory of mind have noted that joint attention might  be a 
precursor of mentalization, and might even offer a first case of  mental concept 
application23. Joint attention is a three term relation, between two organisms 
and an object or event, the first directing its gaze to some definite portion of 
space, the second following the gaze of the former to the relevant location.  
In most animal species,  a fixed stare at oneself is routinely interpreted  as 
possible predator hazard. Such an interpretation does not have to rely on any 
mental concept. Gaze aversion is among primates the normal response to 
another's stare. Gaze nevertheless carries information of a different sort, 
namely it indicates which portion of the environment another selects as 
potentially relevant in the present context. Again, mental concepts do not have 
to be used for an animal succeeding at extracting the  information that is of 
interest to him, i.e. not on what the other finds relevant, but on what is 
relevant. Still great apes could after all take advantage of relevance of gaze 
orientation in a mental way. Juan Carlos Gomez suggests that  gaze could also 
be used by apes (but not by monkeys) in ostensive communication, "as an 
expression of their intention to communicate and to address other 
individuals".24 In another work, Gomez argues that [hand-reared] gorillas can 
implicitly understand that requesting involves monitoring the attention of the 
person whose help is requested25. Now if joint attention in human infants 
plays an important role as a precursor of theory of mind, this is a very 
interesting claim. Would great apes, at least in certain circumstances, be able to 
understand "seeing as knowing" ? 
 
Communication in humans and nonhumans. 
 
Let us pause here a moment to comment on how communication  is to be 
understood both in the context of animal coordination and in the present 
discussion of joint attention as a mental concept. Such considerations, as will 
appear later, are essential for understanding properly the contrast between 
mental and social explanations of behaviour. In the Gricean paradigm, 
communicating depends on the presence of several intentions : the speaker S 
intends  
a) that by uttering  x  S will produce a response r in an audience A; 
b) that A recognizes this first intention. 
c) that the fact that A recognizes this first intention is in part a reason for A's 
response r. 
Condition c, which stresses the reflexive character of the communicative 
intention, (the understanding of its own recognition being presented as crucial 
for achieving adequate communication) seems to discourage any attempt at 
attributing communicative intentions to "non-sophisticated intentional 
systems"26, i.e. to organisms that cannot metarepresent others'mental states - 
i.e. represent them as  mental states [intentions] whose satisfaction depend on 
their being adequately represented by the receiver.  
 Sperber & Wilson  suggest some useful clarifications in Grice's analysis, that 
effect a welcome weakening of the concept of communication. First, the 
"overtness" of the intention to communicate can be replaced by a less 
demanding and more precise condition of "being mutually manifest"-- implying 
that communicating individuals share a cognitive environment. Second, 
Sperber & Wilson suggest that there is a continuum of cases between showing 
something and making an utterance, all of them belonging to ostension. 
Ostension consists in two layers :"first, there is the information which has been, 
so to speak, pointed out; second, there is the information that the first layer of 
information has been intentionally pointed out"27. In highly social animals as 
humans are, as Sperber & Wilson rightly stress, one needs to know the 
intention that governs ostension to understand what is relevant in it, i.e. to 
carry out the inferences that will allow  grasping  the intended informational 
content. Who the sender is becomes highly relevant, as well as the particular 
characteristics of the message token. 
Still, sometimes it may be enough to pick up the first layer. This applies in 
particular to typically rigid kinds of coded communication. In non verbal 
animals, the work often simply consists in making something known to a 
receiver, who simply uses the information without further processing.   It may 
of course also be essential for each individual to be able, not only to pick up 
information delivered by other members of the group, either on external or 
social events (predator presence, social hierarchy in the group, availability for 
mating, etc.), but also to detect the intention of the signaller when signalling. 
Such an intention will not be identified by the signallee   as an internal state of 
the signaller, not even as a disposition to act or as a particular behavior, but as a 
motivating stimulus, triggering a sexual approach behaviour, for example. A 
number of species have evolved specialized codes to convey a specific 
information. As a consequence of evolutionary "arm-race" described by 
Dawkins and Krebs28, other species have evolved a similar code to take 
advantage of the hard-wired responses to the primary message. In those kinds 
of cases, the individuals  communicate on the basis of nonflexible stimulus-
response associations. The sender has some kind of expectation for a certain 
kind of response, in the sense that its own behavior depends upon succeeding 
at conveying some relevant information. The arms-race puts new evolutionary 
pressure for more fine-grained intention-detectors, which leads to mentalizing 
animals. 
 
Communication can thus be realized between animals who do not have the 
concept of an intention, but who do have the capacity to respond in a goal-
oriented way to imperative signals. Although they do not communicate in any 
"mental" way, i.e. by relying on the identification of the communicative 
intention in the strong sense of condition c, they succeed at "transferring 
information to an appropriate audience", in the terms of Philips and Austad29. 
Coded signals play a prominent role in animal communication, yet animals 
from many different species can also invent new means of conveying 
information -  using behaviours or features of the environment to make others 
receptive to their motivations (a domestic dog may bring a ball to indicate play 
mood, or go to the door to indicate desire to get out). Thus they can use not 
only (hard-wired) signals, but also what Philips and Austad name "signs". Let us 
then come back to ostensive communication in great apes. 
 
 
Ostensive communication and mental concepts 
 
It has been suggested that "in the great apes there is evidence that eye contact 
has evolved into an ostensive behavior associated with the expression and 
assessment of communicative intent"30. As was indicated above, an ostensive 
behavior includes two "layers" : showing some piece of information and 
showing that it is shown intentionally. To secure the second step, the sender 
has to help the recipient to make the correct inference. One of the most usual 
ways of achieving this consists in addressing the recipient, for instance exposing  
one's own gaze in a particular way (for example looking successively at the 
recipient's eyes and at the object and back again at the recipient's eyes). The 
idea is, in Gomez' words, to call "someone's attention not just upon oneself, but 
upon one's own attention"31. Meeting the gaze of the target recipient might be 
understood as  meaning "wait for a message coming from me to you". It is a 
preliminary step to mark all the coming information as a piece of intentional 
communication. (In humans, it may also have many other  inferred meanings 
depending on context). One question has to be raised to understand the 
intentional range of this addressing behavior. Is the kind of mechanism that 
allows to understand a gaze as an addressing behavior coded or inferential ? In 
the first case, the addressee  uses a conventional signal for attracting attention. 
In the second case, the addressee uses contextual cues to assess what is the 
information conveyed : he notices that someone is looking at his own eyes, 
understands that the addresser is not watching him gratuitously, and concludes 
that he is expected to watch upcoming, addresser-related, events. The 
difference is crucial for assessing the communicative intention that causes the 
behavior. If the  direction of gaze works as a coded signal, it can easily be 
picked up without any deeper understanding of the relevance of someone's 
gaze. By contrast, if it is inferred by using relevance criteria, then the animal 
should understand that looking implies  acquiring perceptual knowledge. 
 
According to Gomez,  great apes, in contrast with monkeys, seem able to pick 
up someone's attention by using an "addressing" behavior through eye-
contact32. De Waal reports that apes look at each other's eyes while 
reconciling33. Hand-reared gorillas have a repertoire of attention-getting 
gestures that they use with their human caretakers when they want to express 
requests. Observations by Menzel on chimpanzees suggest that they look at 
conspecifics's faces before showing them the location of a hidden object34. 
Many other similar observations were made on hand-reared bonobos and 
orangutans. In all observed cases though, with possibly the puzzling exception 
of Menzel's observations,  the apes use addressing and redirecting of the 
addressee's attention exclusively in the context of requests, whereas they fail to 
issue protodeclaratives as do all human infants from about one 9 months on.  
The basic difference between a protoimperative (a request) and a 
protodeclarative is that, while the first is an act soliciting the other's help for 
changing the world (e.g., getting a desired object), the second attempts to 
monitor the attention of an addressee to some piece of information : it is not 
attempting to change an  observed condition O, but only the mental attitude of 
somebody else in having him perceive O.  
 
How are we to model such a request-related ostensive communication 
behaviour ? It could be seen as involving a metarepresentational capacity, 
insofar as it includes  a representation of the fact that something is going to be 
used intentionally as a representation. Even discarding the infinity of successive 
reflexive levels as involved in Grice's condition of mutual knowledge in 
communication, and accepting instead Sperber & Wilson's weaker notion of 
mutual manifestedness, still this presupposes that both the sender and the 
receiver are able to represent both that F and that F is being represented 
intentionally.  So maybe do we have here the distinctive property of 
mindreading organisms : being able, generally, to construct representations on 
representations, allows interpreting mental states in others --  i.e.  storing and 
retrieving informational structures about  first-order epistemic and 
motivational contents in others or in oneself. The required generality in 
applying mental concepts such as desire or belief would thus be explained by a 
metarepresentational competence that allows to categorize representations  
according to their mental functions. The capacity to categorize mentally would 
only be made possible by a capacity to represent metacognitive properties. 
Now this hypothesis does not seem consistent with all the comparative work 
done on chimpanzees' and human children's mentalizing 
performances.Whereas a metarepresentational task  is achieved at 3 and a half 
in humans, it is not  unambiguously and generally passed by adult nonhuman 
primates.35 
 
First-order mental representations ? 
 
Gomez and his colleagues have an interesting suggestion that would allow to 
sidestep the metarepresentational obstacle. They make two claims. First, non-
linguistic animals or human infants, in preverbal request behaviors,  have a 
way to understand attention that is "based upon the first-order representation 
of the external manifestations of other people's attentional processes"36. 
Attention being correlated with observational cues, an animal might represent 
the mental state of attention in a purely implicit way, by using the causal link 
connecting eye-contact or direction of gaze with subsequent behaviour. He 
could know how to monitor attention in the addressee in order to secure the 
latter's further cooperation without having yet any metarepresentational 
ability. Once attention contact is established and used in a practical way, 
metarepresentations could be later constructed, and enrich the understanding 
of the cognitive implications of attentional states. 37 Therefore, in this view, 
protoimperatives (as well as protodeclaratives in infants) are first expressed in a 
first-order representational format. Instead of forming the output of a modular 
metarepresentational capacity, as in Leslie's view, they are assumed to  later 
give rise to metarepresentational constructions, which in turn allow  a theory of 
mind to develop. 
Second, the authors  suggest that what distinguishes protoimperatives from 
protodeclaratives is not so much a difference in representational structure, as a 
difference in motivational properties. Protodeclaratives have as their goals  "the 
external manifestations of attention and emotion", whereas protoimperatives  
"use those manifestations as means to regulate a variety of behaviours in other 
people"38. To issue a protodeclarative, one has to be interested in people, not in 
things. Or, more exactly, one must find pleasure at extracting from others, at 
will, diversified, object- and event- related emotions. Nonhuman primates in 
fact are not interested "intrinsically" in their conspecifics'emotions. 
The authors conclude that anthropoid primates do have access to mental 
information of the attentional kind, use it in their behaviour, but simply do not 
care about their conspecifics'emotions for their own sake. In analogy with 
autistic children, who do not engage in protodeclaratives for lack of sensitivity 
to expressions of emotion39, great apes do enjoy some kind of "primitive" 
mental understanding of conspecifics, while failing to develop a 
metarepresentational theory of mind. 
 
The strategy of advancing these two claims against a strong modularist 
metarepresentational theory has the merit of stressing the role of empathy - 
transmission of emotional states with conspecific - in animal communication 
and social coordination. Developmental psychologists have insisted that the 
initial phase of communication in human infants crucially involves affective 
communication between the caregiver and the child.40 Autism could be partly 
explained by a deficit in empathy in the autistic child, preventing him from 
taking advantage of ostensive behaviors for lack of interest in   emotional 
stimuli.  
Still such an explanation leaves unclear exactly how far "true requests" involve 
mental knowledge. Gomez and Tamarit contrast  three levels of 
protoimperatives made through contact gestures, that can be exemplified in a 
number of animal behaviors towards their human caretakers. The animal can 
take someone as a physical mean to achieve some end, to be pushed or 
dragged; he can see him/her as an agent able to act by him/herself ; finally he 
can take someone as a subject  : reasons to act are now included in the overall 
representation of the request situation. Looking at the eyes when soliciting is 
now understood by the gorilla as being  'as important as the gesture itself for 
the latter to become effective"41. 
To see why this interpretation unduly inflates the role of a mental component 
in communication, it can be useful to recall that it is an essential property of a 
concept that it be intensional; in other words, each particular concept expresses 
one particular way of accessing a reference, and it cannot be replaced by any 
other concept with the same extension. In Frege's terms, a concept is a "way of 
donation of reference". Granted that some internal representing state in the ape 
does refer to someone's attentional availability, it does not follow that this state 
instantiates a mental concept; there can be many ways of referring to a mental 
event, some mental, some observational. As we saw earlier, animals can take 
advantage of perceptual cues to identify motivational states (smells, for 
example, or various signals, like the "play face" in the ape for intention to play, 
or the bow in canids). Ostensive communication can qualify as a mental routine 
only if it is adequately connected with mental concepts, in which internal states 
are categorized with the help of mental marks. If ostensive communication is 
secured simply by using coded signals, the animals engaged in that 
communication do not need to represent any kind of knowledge as being 
possessed by another individual in virtue of its looking. The ape just knows 
that X looking to Y is a precondition for  X helping Y. 
It may be worth noting, at this point, that the role of empathy  in mental 
concepts acquisition is far from clear. To empathize is to feel the same as 
someone else. There is in this case a distinct qualitative impression that is 
entertained by the subject. This impression could qualify automatically as 
mental if, by that term, was meant the fact that something appears under a 
particular quale or set of qualia42. However, if such a subjectivist view is taken 
on the nature of minds, one is lead to a dead-end when it comes to explaining  
the minds of nonhuman animals. There is no  way we can ever feel as an ape or 
as a dog, and as a consequence no way to understand  the ape's  or the dog's 
mind. Morevoer, the qualitative character of felt emotions in empathy might in 
this perspective warrant the attribution of a mind, but not the attribution of a 
mentalizing capacity to the organism. 
If one adopts a functional instead of a subjectivist view on the mental, one may 
consider that empathy fails to qualify as involving mental concepts. True, it 
endows the individual with affective experiences that provide the perceptual 
inputs with the values that conspecifics associate to them. The animal could 
form motivational categories such as "pleasant", "dangerous", etc. Empathy 
seems to have the function of effecting social coordination, by automatically 
tuning various individuals to the same kind of responses. But empathy does 
not provide by itself the individual animal with an ability to apply to his 
emotional flow  boundaries as to types of emotional qualia, that seem properly 
connected to other mental concepts. Empathy does not even provide the 
notion that some experience is being shared by two (or more) individuals. 
Although empathy is a rich source of various emotional states, it does not need 
to be brought into a conceptual format. 
We may then conclude that, whether they  are receptive or not to other's 
emotional states and intrinsically interested into them or not, apes may achieve 
social coordination in request without using mental-concepts. It is compatible 
with the data  collected by Gomez that the gorilla picked up the human 
behaviour of attention-capture and attention-monitoring in social contexts in 
order to have its requests fulfilled, without understanding the causal efficacy of 
attention as a mental instrument for directing deliberate knowledge acquisition 
in other minds. There is no reason to consider that this  acquired know-how  
implicitly taps on any mental knowledge. Even though theory of mind 
acquisition depends upon the existence of some  mechanism for joint-attention, 
it does not follow that joint-attention presupposes or involves in any way 
theory of mind capacities, even "implicit" ones. 
 
 
Imagining how things could be 
 
Another way of suggesting that great apes  could have mentalizing capacities 
consists in showing that there is an intermediary phase between simply 
representing the world, and metarepresenting it. The crucial feature of this 
approach consists in realizing that mindreading presupposes an antecedent 
ability to represent non-present situations, i.e. past, future, or more generally 
counterfactual situations as such. The key to epistemic attribution in nonverbal 
animals would lie in imagining hypothetical situations.  This idea is made 
plausible by work on theory of mind acquisition in human children. 
Human children above 2 years of age, according to Josef Perner, are "situation 
theorists"43, insofar as they have trouble differenciating a picture and the 
situation that it represents; thus they cannot yet understand a picture, or any 
other representational item, "as a representation" (which is, in Perner's 
perspective, a necessary condition for having metarepresentations). But they 
still can grasp the representational content of a picture. Only later (around 3 
and a half) will the children be able to form an adequate concept of 
representation, as a relation between a medium and a content. At this point the 
child can form the concept of belief, a concept that cannot be reduced to some 
hypothetical aspect that the world could turn out to have. Now Perner's 
hypothesis is that autistic children, although they fail in the false belief task, do 
succeed at other tasks involving  counterfactual states of the world, such as the 
Zaitchik task44. Autistic children could after all be sophisticated situation 
theorists. They would not  be totally deprived of mental concepts, but they 
would lack non-situational mental concepts. 
 
Accordingly anthropoid primates, as well as other nonhuman vertebrates, 
could be taken to lack a concept of representation as representation as is the 
case for  younger human children  -- they actually have chance performance at 
the false belief task --, but still be "situation theorists", and therefore be able to 
handle some kinds of mental concepts - those that are possible-world oriented. 
Andrew Whiten compares three types of cognitive capacities that could involve 
this type of representational ability: imitation, pretense and mindreading45.  
According to Whiten, all three cases require that a second-order representation 
should be constructed on some first-order representation. In imitation, one 
should form a primary representation of the act performed by the model, and 
a secondary representation of the act in the imitating self. In pretense, a 
primary representation -- e.g. of a banana -- helps to construct a secondary 
representation -- of a banana used as a telephone. Finally in mindreading, there 
is the primary representation that F is- or is not - the case, and the secondary 
representation that F might not be believed to be - or not to be- the case.  
Such a comparison  of secondary representations use in the three cases is 
obviously theory-driven. Whiten's comparison favors a theory-theory of mind 
approach, according to which mindreading crucially involves  internal, 
[domain-general or domain-specific] innate representational capacities. An 
alternative theory of mindreading acquisition, named simulation theory, could  
offer an equally convincing parallel account of what  those three cases have in 
common. Imitation consists in acting "as if I am you doing F". Pretending is 
"acting as if I was an X doing F". Mindreading is doing "as if I was in your 
situation, able to think what you think".  
What is interesting to note is that, whatever the theoretical framework we 
select, success in these kinds of activities supposes two major subcapacities : the 
first is that the organism must be able to "go beyond representing things as 
they are", and "represent them as they might be", as Whiten correctly points 
out46. In other words, the organism should take situations as variable inputs to 
be dealt with, and not be confined to representing occurrent stimuli. This 
amounts to saying that the organism can use concepts referring to situation 
components and dynamics, and combine them at will to imagine other possible 
situations. The second is that the organism must maintain his "secondary" 
representation - or his simulated content - active  in his working memory long 
enough to allow all the consequences to be drawn in the possible world under 
construction. While engaged in this kind of  mental activity about possible 
worlds, it must resist  solicitations from the environment. For example, while 
pretending that a banana is a telephone, he must not eat the banana. While 
voluntarily imitating someone47, he must refrain from turning his head to see 
an incoming individual. While mindreading he must keep in mind what the 
other's  perspective on the facts is, even when it differs from his own. This 
capacity of resisting prepotent stimuli is not itself dependent on the ability to 
mindread, to imitate or to pretend. It certainly is their common condition. We 
shall later see that this may help understand why external word-language 
makes such a difference for mindreading in primates. Let us first explore what 
is the range in which nonhuman primates, as situation theorists, engage in 
imitation, pretense, and mindreading. If great apes are situation theorists, one 
might expect that they have some significant imaginative capacities, while 




Although primates are traditionally considered as prone to "ape", cognitive 
imitation is far from being present in all species. Levels of imitation should be 
carefully distinguished before evaluating primates'achievements. It is known 
that successful imitation of a course of action can result from stimulus 
enhancement or observational conditioning. Cognitive imitation that is of 
interest for mental concept attribution involves several potential capacities :  
noticing the results of goal-directed behaviour,  understanding  goal or 
intention of action, and understanding the means-end relation in a goal-
oriented behavioural sequence.48 
Nonhuman primates seem to have limited ways of imitating their conspecifics 
in various tool-use and food-preparation techniques. Some authors assume that 
great apes can imitate at the "program-level" of task organization and goal-
structure49. In other words, the animals are supposed to copy the "logical 
structure" of the task, and to identify the various subgoals that have to be 
satisfied for the final outcome to be reached. It is widely recognized that they 
nevertheless fail to copy the sequence of motor performances that the others 
perform in order to complete the action. The important question for our 
present inquiry, is to know what kind of representation is involved in non-
human primate imitation.  It seems that such "program-level imitation" can be 
achieved by representing intermediate subgoals,  while leaving the means to 
reach them unspecified. Apes seem to engage in what has been called 
emulation learning  about the objects50 : while unable to reproduce the model's 
behaviour(impersonating  the model),  they try to reach the result that the 
model's action produced. 
This kind of imitation-as-emulation appears to involve a capacity for 
representing a possible situation where the goal is satisfied. But it seems that a 
chimpanzee, for example, cannot represent and memorize the details of a 
means-end structure51. Maybe what is missing is constructing a hierarchy of 
motor images  as a paradigm for one's own action. What the animal simulates 
is only the motivational structure and its final state : goal achievement. The 
apes can learn what the aims of the model are, but they cannot simulate 
another creature developing  steps of action over time.  
Imitation in apes suggests that apes might at least  understand what someone 
tries to do. This seems consonant with experimental work done by Premack,  in 
which a female chimpanzee, Sarah,  is proven able to differenciate several kinds 
of problem-solving situations and even to distinguish relevant  from irrelevant 
solutions52. Although imitation and ability to understand purpose are 
generally considered as precursors of a theory of mind in human children53, 
and not as constituents of such a theory, one still may insist that understanding 
purpose can  give rise to a kind of economical, restricted theory of social 
behavior, in which an animal can understand that acts lead to results, and that 
conspecifics usually do things in order to secure certain ends.  
 Imitation in the anthropoid primates strongly suggests that understanding 
purpose is dissociable from understanding belief. Being able to grasp purpose, 
apes can try to reach the result achieved by someone else by performing an 
action with the same goal. They also can predict that given some motivational 
object, it will become a goal for another individual. This kind of capacity 
explains most behaviors often interpreted in richer epistemic terms : 
chimpanzees can hide their sexual arousal from other males as a subgoal in the 
larger sexual intercourse plan of action. "Not showing sex condition to males" 
might be an important social condition, independently of the belief that can be 
attributed to the watching males to rationalize that step. 
Being unable to understand belief possession,  the apes then understandably 
lack the motivation for learning epistemic conditions for succeeding at a task. 
They may represent various counterfactual situations, -- including goals -- but 
not counterfactual sets of beliefs. Therefore they cannot fully represent 
ignorance in themselves and in others, and not be tempted to teach, or want to 
be taught. 
Evidence on ape imitation reviewed above seems at first blush compatible with 
two different hypotheses explaining the limits of imitation behaviors and their 
relation with theory of mind limitations. One might suppose that the animals 
do understand the means-end sequence in each particular step of a complex 
task, understand that to each subresult corresponds a particular adapted 
behavior that should be learnt, but fail to store the corresponding data and/or 
to retrieve them effectively. On the other hand, one might  suggest that the 
animals fail to use the know-how of other animals because they fail to 
understand the contribution of knowledge to successful action. The first 
hypothesis thus tends to blame limitations in imitation on insufficient memory 
and executive functions ; the second on defective mentalization. I will try to 
show below that in fact the two hypotheses can be combined to understand a 
deficit in mentalization and in imitation as dual effects of a same executive 
feature. 
 
Pretense and deception 
 
Pretend play, also called symbolic play, is an activity that occurs spontaneously 
in normal human children. It can take several forms : substituting an object for 
another (telephoning with a banana as a receiver), attributing pretended 
properties to an object (taking a match box to be a car) or imagining non 
existant entities (filling a toy cup with imaginary milk). For Leslie, shared 
pretense - which appears around 18 months - has the same cognitive format as 
mindreading: it involves a general datastructure inside which an agent is 
attributed a propositional attitude - pretending - about a given real object [the 
content of a primary representation], to the effect that it has some imaginary 
property [content of a secondary representation]. The idea is that pretending 
involves decoupling two representations, which allows a metarepresentation of 
someone else's attitude to be constructed. In pretending, one can attribute truly 
non factually true mental contents ; it generates the kind of opacity that is 
characteristic of mindreading (what the other believes is not necessarily what is 
real).  
Now Perner's account can also explain why a toddler of 18 months can pretend 
play : he can represent a counterfactual situation in which one makes a call by 
using bananas. In fact, the child does not need to attribute mental states  to 
accomplish this. He only  needs to vary the concept extensions in order to 
freely invent possible worlds. Coordinating imaginings with another individual 
does not involve representing mental content in the other. Doing the same 
thing or (in social play) complementary acts with a sense of common 
understanding of how things are  in the imaginary world is enough for the play 
to go on in a satisfactory way. No metarepresentation of mental state contents 
seems necessary. 
In nonhuman animals, one finds only  few cases of pretend play (or symbolic 
play), the only uncontroversial cases being provided by hand-reared apes54. 
But there is another common achievement in primates that   could be 
compared with  pretend play for its cognitive requirements , i.e. tactic 
deception. 
Just as is the case in pretend play,  deception could be seen to involve 
decoupling a real situation and an imaginary one, and attributing the decoupled 
situation to the other individual (representing the imaginary situation as real). 
In contradistinction to pretend play, the deceiving animal does something in a 
context that does not justify what it does in the other's perspective (he does not 
communicate his context shift, as is the case in play). His context shift remains 
private, with results that are exclusively related so self-interest. For example 
Byrne describes the tactics of a young baboon who screams as if abused to get 
his mother to chase away a subordinate female, Mel,  from a corm she had just 
painfully dug out55. Again, this can be understood in the following way : "Were 
it the case that I was screaming for abuse, my mother would chase Mel away.  
Mel's leaving the scene might help me get her corm. Scream for abuse !"  
A situation theorist can model the same kind of case, without having to 
represent the intermediate causal link -- the mental content in his mother's 
mind, [that her child is abused by Mel] -- between his scream and his mother's 
stepping in. Decoupling can be explained in counterfactual terms, without 
having to attribute a complex metarepresentational structure to the nonhuman 
animal or to the human toddler. 
 
Simulation as exercised in great apes 
 
To see why decoupling does not have to be metarepresentational , it may be  
useful to contrast two ways of simulating. Let us note first that simulation is in 
the humans a powerful way of achieving all the cognitive abilities that have 
been examined. Imitating is acting here and now as the other does, or did - 
simulating fully and "on-line" his actions, or his movements. Pretend playing is 
simulating in a sketchy way and "partly on-line" that you are doing something -
- you can manipulate real objects, props or imaginary objects. Mindreading 
beliefs is pretending "off-line", in the sense that you just feed imaginary possible 
input states and just process what you would normally do, or feel, if these 
states where actually yours (56). 
Now although Perner does not defend a simulation-theory of mindreading, 
one can use his view on situation theory to represent a very simple form of 
simulation that is clearly non-metarepresentational, and contrast this simple 
simulation with more elaborate forms that allow belief representation. 
Simulating in its core could consist in restricting the scope of a mental process 
or assertion to some particular, unusual context.  
 
François Recanati 57 suggests the following representation : 
 
(1) [s] = w    σ 
 
Proposition (1)  expresses the fact that a subject represents a certain imaginary 
situation s  in a world distinct from the actual world, such that some fact  s 
holds in that world. According to Recanati, we engage in simulation each time 
we form a representation that concerns an imaginary situation. In other words, 
we treat in thought this imaginary situation as if it were real, and consider its 
various relevant consequences. Exercising simulation in  this way is what allows 
great apes, and younger human children, to understand utterances on past, 
future, distant or fictional events like : 
(2) There would be bananas for lunch. I would eat plenty. 
(3) In those days there was a  dragon. He loved to feed on people. 
(4) A long time ago, Granma was my age. 
To achieve this cognitive understanding, a subject must be able to represent s 
and to hold in mind that  property  s  is true in s. 
According to Recanati, exercising simulation should not be confused with 
exploiting simulation. In the first case, one simply makes a supposition and 
considers some salient consequence of that supposition, as an output 
immediately delivered by the very process of simulating. In the second, one 
asserts inside the real world that making the supposition entails  some 
particular proposition. The structure of that mental operation is truly 
metarepresentational, insofar as the imaginary situation is now relocated 
within the real world (noted @), and its content made explicit relative to the 
representational process - pretending, believing, imagining -  that made it 
possible. The quotation marks express the fact that the structure in quotation is 
mentioned (and not used anymore) : 
 
(5)    s'= @            <<  s  = w     σ  >> 
 
 (5) thus expresses a metarepresentation, to the effect that in some part at some 
time in the real world, there is a representation of a  situation in a supposed 
world w where  s holds. 
 Applying this distinction to the case of  mentalizing performances in 
nonhuman and human primates, it is quite different a matter to represent a 
counterfactual such as 
 
(6)  s1  screaming  next to  A  = w  A leaving scene  
(where  A refers to an adult animal  collecting some desired food) 
 
and to represent a conditional assertion true in a type of situations :  
 
(7) "if in the real world, the situation is such that a scream next to A is produced 
by me, it will be represented  in my  mother's world as the situation such that A 
abuses   me, and as a result she will chase the abuser away". 
 
s'   [ child screaming  next to A] = @   <<  s1  [abusive adult] = mw  mother 
to chase A  away  >> 58. 
 
In (7),  s' is the real situation, in which no abuse is presently taking place, but in 
which the animal neverthess produces a scream in the vicinity of A;  s1 is the 
situation which is represented as being the one that the mother will take to be 
the case. In this counterfactual situation whose plausibility hinges only on the 
actual scream production, the mother should act in conformity with the 
thought that her child is abused, i.e. chase the [pretended] abuser away. In 
contrast with (6), in which no metarepresentation was necessary for the young 
to get rid of the adult, it is now in virtue of his capacity at exploiting the regular 
relationship between a particular counterfactual  situation and the resulting 
motivated acts that the animal produces his call and reaches  the intended 
result. 
While the counterfactual simulation (6) is effected, so to speak, inside the 
imagined world, the metarepresentational simulation (7) is effected inside the 
real world where all the inferences from  various epistemic contents can be 
made. Metarepresentation is thus a consequence of exploiting simulation in a 
deductive way. It offers a  structure into which one can attribute a belief, a 
desire, and derive the various consequences of these representations according 
to their contents.  If one engages in (7), one needs to make an assertion - or to 
construct a mental symbol -  that mentions a represented situation, and to 
assert that, as represented, such a situation "supports such and such facts".  
 
Following a number of  ethologists, we could describe tactic deception, as other 
cases of pretending in the  apes, in terms of (7) :  an animal develops skills for 
exploiting  simulation , and obtains  on the basis of a complex 
metarepresentation of situations seen from the others' points of view some 
individual advantage. But such a rich interpretation of animal deception is not 
needed : given what is known on similar  processes in imitation and pretense, it 
is not likely that the baboon exploits its simulation in the sense that it 
metarepresents, from the real world's perspective, how  it could be beneficial to 
pretend that a certain situation obtains. It seems more plausible  that the animal 
has a capacity for entertaining counterfactual thoughts about possible 
situations, i.e. of simulating that he is in such and such a situation.  Entertaining 
counterfactual thoughts may be a necessary step for acquiring mental concepts, 
as is seen in the very presence of a "situation-shaped" thought like (1) within a 
metarepresentational thought like (5). But in itself, it does not allow the animal 
to represent mental states in others. It only allows him to extract some 
interesting regularities and to use them even in the absence of their triggering 
stimuli. 
 
How executive functions could play a major role in mentalizing 
 
As we saw earlier, there is ample evidence that hand-reared primates are much 
more advanced than wild animals in using mental concepts. They seem to be 
able to cope with deception, to pretend, to imitate and to understand tool use, 
not to mention  ostensive communication gestures, whereas wild animals 
generally fail to present all these abilities. It might be the case, as  it seems to be 
for self-recognition, that mental concepts emerge developmentally as well as 
phylogenetically. One possible reason of this difference could lie in language 
use, and in the strengthening of executive processes that such a language use 
indirectly allows.  
To show how symbol use can have executive implications, it is important to 
contrast two types of behavior-control. Exogeneous control is what happens 
when an organism responds to some salient feature of the environment, either 
because it has learnt to do so, or because it applies an innate fixed action 
pattern. Endogeneous control, on the other hand, characterises behaviors that 
have been selected by the individual for contextual reasons. One of the 
consequences of symbol use could be to help an organism maintain 
endogeneous control against powerful exogeneous stimuli.  
Recent experimental work on primates seems to show that language-trained 
animals could present better performances in tasks involving   executive 
functions. Sarah Boysen has trained chimpanzees to learn numerosity in sets of 
objects and to learn  corresponding numerical symbols59. The animals then are 
given a task in which their numerical knowledge is put to use. Among two 
plates X and Y with unequal numbers of sweets,  a chimpanzee A has to point 
to the plate X that another animal B will get as a result of A's pointing to it; A 
will receive himself the remaining plate Y. Now two conditions are 
distinguished. In condition 1, the selecting animals see the plates with their 
contents. In condition 2, the animals see numbers indicating how many sweets 
the plates will contain. The interesting contrastive result is the following : in the 
first condition, the animals generally fail to refrain from pointing to the   
plentiful plate. In spite of the growing rage and frustration at the unwelcome 
results of their own choices, they persist in their "prepotent" pointing. In the 
second condition however, the same animals are able to refrain from obeying 
stimulus-driven gestures : they do not point to what they want to have, but to 
what the other will get. 
Although this second performance does not directly involve mental concepts, 
there are good reasons to insist that it has an important feature in common 
with belief attribution. For the chimpanzee who selects the plentiful dish fails to 
construct the situation as embedded within a larger rule, while the successful 
performer (chosing the symbol for the smallest number) is able to make his 
choice relative to his long-term goal as defined by that rule60. It is important 
that the same animal may, according to the nature of the stimulus - concrete or 
symbolic - fail or pass the test. This suggests that performance depends not 
only on intrinsic capacities for representing a rule, but also on the effects that 
the coding has on execution. If we come back to our previous distinction 
between exercising and exploiting simulation, we see that the animal remains in 
condition 1 a situation theorist, as represented by (1):  there is something up for 
grabs, and he immediately activates the corresponding goal. He "forgets" the 
rule specifying that he will not  get for himself what he first points to, a rule 
whose form is represented by (5). What Perner called a situation theorist might 
thus be someone who can apply several rules, but one at a time, in some 
exogeneously controlled way. The problem in condition 1 would be not 
adequately described by saying that the ape cannot represent the embedding 
rule (for he does in condition 2); the problem is rather that he cannot act  on the 
basis of the  representation of the larger rule, because of the prepotence of the 
exogeneous stimulus. 
The same contrast between rules of different scopes is at work in belief states. 
Belief is essentially "perspectival": it is not dictated exclusively  by the 
corresponding objective situation in the world, but by the world as 
apprehended  by a believer. In order to attribute a belief to someone else, one  
has again to master  two rules. The first rule ("one believes the world to be how 
it is") has to be embedded in a larger rule ("one believes the world to be how it 
is, except when one has misleading representations"). 
 
If this is true, one should expect to find the same kind of overlap in executive 
tasks and in mentalizing tasks in human children. It seems indeed to be the 
case. James Russell and his collaborators had devised earlier a task with the 
same structure as Sarah Boysen's condition 1. Called the Windows Task61, it 
consists in two boxes whose content can be perceived by the child through a 
window: one contains a chocolate, the other is empty. The child must point to 
the box whose content will be given to the opponent. As was the case for the 
chimpanzees, 3-year old children and autistic children cannot help pointing to 
the baited box, whereas 4-year olds point to the  empty box. James Russell and 
coll. later explored the way to make the task easier by presenting a 
representation of the chocolate instead of the actual prepotent stimulus, and 
found the children were half as many to perseverate showing the baited box 
when their were shown brown circles instead of chocolate buttons. As the 
author  notes, there is an empirical parallel, as well as a conceptual one, 
between success at the windows task and passing the false belief task62. 
 
 Now the reason why  the chimpanzee can benefit from the language form of 
the stimulus may also explain why hand-reared animals may be better at 
strategic deception, and other mentalizing tasks. In condition 2 of Sarah 
Boysen's experiment, the animal seems to be able to regiment his pointing 
behavior inside a contextual arbitrary rule. He may at this point construct 
something like a metarepresentation of the whole situation in the sense of 
proposition (7) above. The numerical symbols that he previously learned may 
prompt, or make easier, a metarepresentational approach of the situation. 
 In a similar way, theory of mind might be both simulatory and subject to 
learning, more exactly  learning how to use a symbolic representation to resist 
the impact of prepotent responses to objects and situations. Apes could have 
mental precursors  similar to humans' (a non-mental gaze-direction detector, 
an attention sharing mechanism, a face detector, empathetic reactions), but fail 
to maintain active rules on embedded contexts for lack of a well-trained 






This article attempted to explore in what sense a theory of mind  could be 
attributed to non-human primates. It was argued that present data do not 
allow  attributing  mental concepts to these anthropoids; although they may be 
said to use mental information in inferring behavior patterns, they do not do so 
by using mental representations. Hand-reared gorillas and chimpanzees, as 
well as other domestic animals, may be able to pick up human attention-
capture and attention monitoring behaviors without grasping the causal 
efficacy of those behaviors as mental instruments for directing other 
individual's awareness. Ostensive communication, in particular, is shown to 
develop independently from any  representation of mental states in others. 
Animal communication as such does not imply generally any deep 
understanding of  intentions to communicate. It might nevertheless exert 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic pressures towards representing mental states, as 
an outcome of the "arms-race" that it opens up for individuals and species.  
The main aim of this paper was to suggest that  theory of mind acquisition in 
the apes depends on two prior capacities : exercising simulation, as when one 
actively disengages from the present environment to imagine a counterfactual 
situation, and exploiting simulation, which implies that an imaginary situation is 
relocated within the real world. Although the apes seem to be good "situation 
theorists", they might be poor "simulation exploiters". It was suggested that the 
latter ability could have an essentially executive dimension, in that it requires 
that working memory activates an abstract (superordinate) general rule in 
which another local (subordinate) rule is embedded. Symbol use could play a 
decisive role in helping an organism to keep endogeneous control on its 
actions, by releasing the vividness of prepotent stimuli at the subordinate level. 
Non-human primates have developed a number of abilities that are related to 
the needs of social life, and that superficially appear to be mental concepts-
driven. They can recognize emotions and use them to predict behavior - as 
many other social animals do. They can interpret others' goals, which allows 
them to reach a certain amount of goal imitation, and interpret others' 
intentions. They probably fail to attribute beliefs about the world to others, and 
still can achieve complex social organization. This suggests that social cognition 
is largely independent from mental cognition. Indeed social cognition may use 
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